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After seven years, the war in El Salvador remains at an impasse. Even US government analysts
agree that neither side can foresee victory in the near future. Because of the nature of guerrilla
warfare, the battleground is shifting from the military to the political. Civilian support such
as food, shelter, logistical aid, and intelligence is essential for the FMLN (Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front). Even where they do not enjoy active support, the rebels rely on public
unwillingness to cooperate with government forces. To win the war, the Salvadoran armed forces
must neutralize civilian support for the insurgents and win backing for their own efforts to defeat
the guerrillas. In 1986 the Salvadoran armed forces launched a major campaign called "United to
Reconstruct." The campaign plan calls for military operations to drive remaining guerrilla forces
out of selected priority areas, followed by intensive propaganda and civilian efforts to restore
government services, regenerate private enterprise, and initiate a variety of assistance programs.
The military hopes that these activities will convince the civilian population to turn away from the
rebels, and pledge their loyalty to the government forces. Civilian defense patrols are organized
by the armed forces to repel guerrilla efforts to penetrate the area. In other strategic areas the
military removes the civilian population from the area to isolate the guerrillas from their bases of
support. This military strategy has been advocated strongly by US military advisers in El Salvador
and endorsed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID resources have
been used for numerous projects and activities related to the United to Reconstruct campaign and
its predecessor, the National Plan. The Reagan administration's stated objective in supporting and
directing the United for Reconstruction counterinsurgency campaign is the defeat of the FMLN
guerrillas by reducing them to a terrorist band. USAID funded projects and activities, according
to the administration, are intended to restore basic services, strengthen local government, and
encourage transfer of leadership from military to civilian authorities. Guerrilla attacks on economic
infrastructure are emphasized and contrasted with what is described as "constructive" efforts by
the government to reestablish basic services and initiate assistance projects. Thus, the guerrillas are
portrayed as responsible for prolonging the war. The administration maintains that coordination
with the military is necessary under the circumstances to prevent guerrilla attacks on restored
services and programs. Critics of administration policy argue that previous attempts in using this
strategy in El Salvador have failed for a variety of reasons. The military was unable to keep the
guerrillas out of the area, civilians refused to participate in civil patrols, and government agencies
were unable to effectively restore services and carry out assistance programs. The battle for political
allegiance also has led to attacks by one side on those suspected of collaborating with the other.
Next, the critics maintain that funding a military- sponsored plan whose objective is the defeat of an
armed insurgency is a misuse of development aid and Economic Support Funds (ESF). A genuine
development process requires active participation by the poor in decisions affecting their lives. Such
participation should increase their ability to secure their basic needs and, in the words of the US
Foreign Assistance Act, "lead lives of decency, dignity, and hope." While assistance programs may
fall short of these objectives in practice, they nevertheless remain the goals of the US development
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program. Enlisting development aid in efforts to achieve a military victory is a perversion of such
aid. By law, ESF is to be furnished to promote economic or political stability. Its use to prolong a
stalemated war results in a superficial stability that relies almost entirely on the continuation of
large infusions of US aid. Tremendous political and economic instability persists in El Salvador
despite large sums of ESF aid over the past six years. The campaign strategy calls for coordination
and incorporation of all activities into a united effort against the guerrillas. Independent agencies
and programs are considered suspect by the government forces. Many private aid providers have
experienced repeated harassment and persecution. (From April 1987 reports by the Coalition for a
New Foreign Policy, Washington, DC.)
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